Introduction
Family business relationship with politics and the State have received little attention in the literature on family businesses which has mostly focused in endogenous over exogenous factors. However, it constitutes a key skill in family business performance and survival. One form this relationship can take is by holding public office, and one of these, the highest, is the head of State. The locus of this paper is an emerging Latin American economy (Colombia) . In the period studied, 1850-2010, ten (10) of the forty-five (45) presidents of the Republic of this Latin American country have been members of six entrepreneurial families. All these families have been a feature of Colombian life for at least 100 years. This paper comprises five sections. The first refers to the growing interest in various disciplines and, in particular business history, to study entrepreneurial families and family business as key forms of business organization in capitalist development. Departing from current ("Manichean") critique to family business, the second section approaches the diverse forms of interaction of entrepreneurial actors with politics and the State. In the third section, the case of one of the six presidential families is presented; in the fourth, all the families are compared using a series of variables (longevity/dynastic character, education, intergenerational social mobility and business diversification). The final section provides a series of considerations on content, method and theory for further research.
Family capitalism, business history and family studies: a need for multi-disciplinary research
Family business is not an anomaly of capitalist development, nor is it an obsolete player on the way to extinction. It is a form of business organization that requires a multidisciplinary approach for its research. Recent international publications agree on their contemporary relevance and the need to study its historical path. In Spain and Latin America, on which most of the papers of this session are focused, there are emblematic family groups of entrepreneurial families whose origin goes back to the second half of the 19th century and that represent a form of business organization different from that of the large multidivisional firm characteristic of US managerial capitalism (Chandler 1977 ).
This form of organization has gradually aroused the interest of academics, not only in the field of management and entrepreneurship (Crismas, Chua, and Sharma 2005; Fernández 2012 ), but in various disciplines, especially researchers in business history and economists interested in corporate governance. In the case of the former, this is reflected in recent international publications (Colli and Rose 2007; Colli 2011 Fernández 2012; Fernández and Colli 2013) ; likewise, it has been recognized (if also stereotyped) by some studies on corporate governance (Morck and Steir 2005) . What is certain, in this new historical phase of globalization, is that the reality of the diverse forms of ownership, governance structures, and organization that family businesses have taken on to endure, defies those who predicted their progressive demise. The example of the family multinationals and their strategy and structures in various parts of the world is evidence of this (Lubinsky, Fear and Fernández 2013; Colli, García-Canal, and Guillén 2013) . The
Latin American multinationals (multilatinas) are already recognized in the bibliography, and the most prominent are those owned and controlled by entrepreneurial families (Casanova 2008; Santiso 2013) . Even in a market such as the Colombian which is smaller and less developed than that of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico or Chile, various family economic groups have, since the beginning of the new century, advanced in their process of internationalization and are now poised to entering the group of multilatinas 3 . A handful of family business groups made their name in the period 1880-1930 and established themselves in the main cities of this "country of regions". In 1975, among the 24 largest conglomerates, nine were family-owned (Superintendencia de Sociedades 1978) . In those years, an economic group from a traditional family of the country's capital city (Bogotá) elite (Grupo Grancolombiano of the Michelsen Uribe family), barely five years in existence, suddenly became the most powerful group in the country. But it was short-lived: in the financial crisis of 1982, the government intervened and the main bank was nationalized, and later the Group was liquidated amid a notorious scandal involving private loans and inappropriate handling of investment funds (Donadio 1983 (Donadio , 1984 Echavarría 1983; Semana 1989 ).
In the following decades, business groups multiplied and gained importance in the economic activity of the country to become a central player in Colombian business (Rodríguez 2010; Dávila 2013) . Three of the four largest business groups are familyowned (Sarmiento Angulo, Santo Domingo and Ardila Lulle) and have been in this position for a quarter of a century (Rodríguez-Satizábal 2010 , Dinero 2013 , Portafolio 2013 A starting point for this work is the recognition of the different developmental paths of capitalism and, more precisely, the variation in forms of business organization in different societies, for example, in emerging economies. In other words, our aim is to study the evolution of entrepreneurial families and family businesses, rather than following the "teleological hierarchy" marked by the development of the United States as archetype for business historians (Herrigel and Zeitlin 2010, 667) . Another starting point states that institutional structures, that is, the systemic relationships between firms and public authorities and the way the market is organized, condition business strategy; public institutions, in turn, could be seen as a resource for the firms, to the extent that they have influence on the formation of the institutional framework (Iversen 2010, 665-666) . This approach is complemented by the perspective of the theory of resource dependency, which studies the relationship between organizations and their environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) . Particularly, the focus is on the strategies and tactics of power and managament control in inter-organizational relations; in this case, between entrepreneurial families and the State, as well as between the families themselves when faced with other players in the market. Over the years, these families and their businesses and groups evolved strategies to operate and consolidate themselves, oriented by the idea that power (not only profit or efficiency) is a key objective (Davis and Cobb 2010) .
Thus, this paper does not focus on endogenous factors that determine the permanence, performance and entrepreneurship of family businesses in the long term. Although it shares with other papers in this session a historical perspective and an interest in gaining insight into common features -as well as national differences -in the track record of family business in Spain and Latin America, it revolves around a different analysis: the entreprenerial family per se and its long-term relationship to politics and the State. Its main aim, perhaps its contribution, is to point out the need for opening the field in this direction, and underline the potential for future research, especially of a comparative historical nature.
The hypothesis is that in the emerging economies of Latin America, large economic groups hierarchically controlled by entrepreneurial families are main players in economic development. Under such circumstances, the skillful handling of the relationship with power and the State, a central but not unique element of the context, leads to the accumulation of resources of political power and builds up a capacity over the long-term (similar to the organizational capabilities of firms) (Chandler 1992 ). This capability is crucial in economic, political and social environments that are turbulent and full of uncertainties, typical of Latin America; and it has evolved over many generations of these entrepreneurial families, giving them a distinctive competence, similar to the core competencies of firms, in their business activities, and of significance because of their enduring nature.
To study this political capability, it is worth considering the approach on productive, unproductive and destructive functions that entrepreneurs deploy in response to the rewards structure (incentives) and the constraints that institutional frameworks (institutions in general and rules of the game in particular) offer in each historical period (Baumol 1968 (Baumol , 2010 Torres 2003) . This perspective, although still under elaboration, is very thought-provoking and provides an insightful perspective on the relationship between business and politics, rather than blindly accepting the easy and trite option that stigmatizes this relationship 4 . In addition to being dynamic, the institutional framework is far from neutral in the face of different social actors, nor does it embody the "common good"; likewise, it is not perceived by everyone in the same way. Its formation (including organization of the State), implementation and modification are influenced by the intervention of the business actors, acting in their own interests. In addition, the behaviour shown by social and economic actors, entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial families, and business lobby groups, is marked by restricted rationality, incomplete information and opportunistic conduct.
For this reason, the conditions of the market in which they operate should be studied, but it is also fundamental to consider the conditions of the institutional environment in which they are immersed; thus, entrepreneurs seek efficiency through adequate management and, at the same time, they exert influence (through one or many forms of (Dávila 2012, 67-70) . These means include:
(i) Voting in elections;
(ii) funding of political campaigns;
(iii) leadership responsibilities in political parties or groups;
(iv) discharge of public office by appointment, especially high level public administration, at a national, departmental or local level; America, or if it is also present in economies of other continents, where entrepreneurial families continue to have hierarchical control over business groups. It is a subject that would make comparative research very attractive. In particular, it could provide evidence that diverges from the "Manichean critique" (Fernández 2003, 3) made by scholars of corporate governance in large businesses, with regard to ownership and family capitalism in the more advanced countries. These scholars contrast it with other forms of capitalism (shareholder capitalism or Anglo American capitalism and bank capitalism): "The studies in this volume provide ample evidence of powerful family economic groups that behave like establishments or like oligarchies, or first the one and then the other" (Morck and Steir 2005, 33) . Basing themselves on Thurow (1989) , Morck and Steir (2005, 33 ) point out that both are able to lead their countries but, while the establishment seeks assurance that its country is functioning in order to reap benefits for itself, the oligarchy has only its own interests in mind, without giving any thought to the future of the country. One of the evils attributed to it, is the "risk of systematic mismanagement" of its businesses leading to macroeconomic instability (Morck 2009 ). According to these authors, instead of From a wider perspective than that of corporate governance, two renowned economists have recently asked themselves: "Why are some nations rich and others poor?
Why do nations fail?" Like their colleagues from corporate governance, they reach a similar verdict: nations fail because of the presence of "extractive institutions"
(economical as well as political) based on elites who design them in a such a way as to make themselves rich and perpetuate their power at the cost of the majority of the population. "Vicious circles" are created that must be converted to "virtuous circles"
(convert "extractive institutions" into "inclusive institutions" and so end the "iron rule of the oligarchy" (Acemoglou and Robinson 2012, 399; 430-431; 388) .
The generalizations of these four authors are reminiscent of other generalizations made about underdevelopment in the 1960s and 1970s. They were fodder for academic debates and international development policies. They originated in ideologically opposite shores. On the one hand, the theories of modernization, rooted in the United States and that may ensnare business historians (Scranton and Fridenson, 2013) . One of these is ignoraning the role of the State as an actor in capitalist development; another is to assume that the experiences of the United States and Europe are "the one best way", as "normal and normative" ("something done so often that you hardly even notice it") (Scranton and Fridenson 2013, 16-22; 47-50; 45) .
In this context, the paper is not concerned with the evolution of the main family businesses in the different periods of Colombian economic development, nor does it in particular allude to the twenty (20) largest family businesses in 2010, the data collected for the quantitative comparative analysis among the countries that the comparative international project of which is part covers 5 . However, it does contribute to exploring a subject (the relationship of entrepreneurial families with politics and the State) that is a fundamental part of the capability for adaptation of Latin American entrepreneruial families to the perennial environmental turbulence in which they are created, within which they develop and wherein they are immersed.
Entrepreneurial and presidential families in Colombia, 1850-2010. The case of the López family (two presidents in four generations)
When talking about presidential families, we refer to those entrepreneurial families that, in addition to being characterized as having an important, diverse and continued economic activity, have also had, in the last 150 years, one or more members as head of State in the Republic of Colombia. The category "presidential families" as such is not explained in the specialized bibliography, although they could be considered family dynasties (Landes 2006; Fernández and Puig 2010 , 1922 -1926 Mariano Ospina Pérez, 1946 -1950 ; "the" López (2 presidents): Alfonso López Pumarejo, 1934 Pumarejo, -1938 Pumarejo, and 1942 Pumarejo, -1946 Alfonso López Michelsen, 1974 ; "the" Santos (2 presidents): Eduardo Santos Montejo, 1938 -1942 Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, 2010 to the present; "the" Reyes (1 president: Rafael Reyes Prieto (1904 -1909 ; "the" Restrepos (1 president): Carlos E.
Restrepo Restrepo (1910 Restrepo ( -1914 ; "the" Sampers (1 president): Ernesto Samper Pizano, 1994 -1998 .
In a very summarised form, we will present below a series of historical, economic, political and social enviroment elements that have conditioned the evolution of family businesses and entrepreneurial families in the last 150 years. A series of expressions associated with Colombia will help to understand the evolution of this country since the mid 19th century: "fragmented land, divided society"; "country of regions"; "country of cities"; "El Dorado country"; "in the early 20th century one of the most underdeveloped countries of the region"; "industrialization did not begin in the capital"; "monoexporter of coffee"; "not an immigrants's land"; "secondary periphery"; "country in which the 19th century lasted until 1920"; "coffee republic 1903-1946"; "a nation despite itself"; "cradle of political violence"; "country unfit for military dictatorships"; "exclusive society"; "high concentration of wealth"; "bipartite regime"; "modest public enterprise"; « narcostained nation », "country in armed conflict since the mid 20th century"; "land of the drug cartels"; "formal electoral democracy"; "notable macroeconomic stability throughout the 20th century". The incumbent mayor (Samuel Moreno, 1997 -2011 , grandson of an ex-president (general Rojas Pinilla, 1953 -1957 ) and son of a presidential candidate in the 1970s, was ousted in a corruption scandal. 8 In Colombia, academic literature on the elites is scarce in comparison with Mexico, Argentina and Peru; this is partly due to the fact that Colombia, being characterized as an "oligarchical democracy" did not stimulate much empirical research. In contrast, in the mid 1970s a research project on economic and political elite in medium sized cities emerged (Dávila 1976) ; and more recently on regional power in ministerial positions in the 20th century (Meisel 2012) .
The pertinence of the phenomenon of presidential families is seen in the ongoing electoral process for presidential elections 2014. As mentioned previously, an heir of the López family will stand against the current president, another member of a presidential family who is aspiring to re-election. A third candidate (Oscar Iván Zuluaga, exChancellor, 2006 , belongs to the third generation of an entrepreneurial family from the coffee-growing region (Antiguo Caldas), whose business group became a steel multilatina, although the family's political path cannot be compared to that of the López nor the Santos family (Semana 2013, 17) . In addition, the candidate Zuluaga was elected by his right-wing coalition party in a bitter contest with another member of the Santos family, Francisco Santos, cousin of the current president (Juan Manuel Santos) as well as his opponent, who was vice president of the country in 2002-2010, during which time the current president was a minister.
Comparative analysis of the six presidential families
In this section, we present a brief comparative analysis of the families studied, according to the following variables: dynastic longevity (number of generations) and nature, regional origin, social intergenerational mobility, education abroad, geographical mobility, family size and sectors of business activity.
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One variable related to the longevity of these families is its dynastic character. This characteristic is uniform within the sample studied. The Ospina, Restrepo, López and
Samper families are all now entering the fifth generation; the Santos, the fourth. Only one family, the Reyes, disappeared as such after the first generation in which one of its members, an export trader of quinine and rubber, became president (Rafael Reyes, 1904-9 Due to space limitations, the bibliographical references for the six families on which this section is based are not detailed in any systematic way. The principal sources are: on the López family (Dávila 2012; Rueda 2010; Iragorri, 2012; Noguera 1986; Zuleta 1966) ; on the Ospina family (Pardo 1946; Ramírez 1996; Molina 2009) [1910] [1911] [1912] [1913] [1914] , there was not another president of the Republic with their name, they have never stopped being intensely involved, very noticeably at a regional level but also with economic power at a national level.
In the case of the Ospina family, who, like the Restrepos, is a Conservative presidential family from Antioquia, it has held the presidency of the Republic three times (more than any other family studied here) and at very different moments of the country's development (1857-1861; 1922-1926; 1946-1950) The impact of this concentration of presidential power in the hands of six families over 150 years is a subject for research, and toward this end examining their productive, unproductive and destructive functions seems to provide fertile ground (Baumol, 2010; Torres, 2003) . Thus, for example, nearly half of these six families played an important Montenegro 2002, Chapter 3). They were never far removed from regional public affairs, forming part of the local elite since the late 18th century (Twinam 1982) . And in the present era, the large family business groups located in the main cities (Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla) not only routinely provide financial support to various presidential candidates, but also enjoy privileged access to senior public officials; lobby the executive and legislative powers; are owners of --or partners in --media groups; participate in large State contracts, and at times have members holding high public office by appointment (presidential advisors, State ministers, ambassadors etc.). In addition, they have never been far removed from negotiations to resolve the armed conflict that has plagued Colombia for the past 25 years (Rettberg 2013). The ways that entrepreneurial families (presidential or not), and also non-family-owned business groups, interact with politics and the State --to a greater or lesser extent, in one combination or another, or at this or that moment in time --depend on the formation, modification and evolution of the country's institutional framework, referred to in this paper. Within this structurally turbulent context, they display, at each specific time and place, various functions that are productive, non-productive or destructive in terms of economic development (Baumol 2011 and Torres 2003) .
For the smaller and less powerful family business groups, as well as entrepreneurial families who operate small-and medium-sized businesses, there is a clear lesson: without strategic handling of the relationship with politics and the State, even at a local level, an entrepreneurial family has very little room to maneuver (even the task of legally registering its companies becomes difficult). It should be added that participation in politics, in the discharge of public office (both by election and appointment), what is known colloquially as "the revolving door" (the step from private sector to temporally holding public office), has among its costs the frictions, conflicts of interests and hostilities that inevitably arise from decision-making, which in the long term can effect the relationship with other families and business sectors.
In presidential families, as well as in any large family business group, the social network (through marriage, kinship, elite schools and universities, professionals, social clubs, regional identification, immigrant colonies, etc.) continues to play a crucial role.
Important to mention, in the context of Latin America the case of conflict-ridden Colombia in the last half century is singled out for the complex and continuing armed conflict ("a prolongued and degraded war") wherein illegal groups (guerrillas, drug traffickers and their networks, paramilitaries and alliances and counteralliances among some of them) paradoxically coexist with a robust record of economic growth and internationally acknowledged macroeconomic stability.
Undeniably, in the destructive entrepreneurial activities deployed by all such groups, cartels typically have been family-based, but also in financial scandals, political corruption and in general the "capture of the State", especially at the local and regional levels, entrepreneurial families have long played a central role. However, entrepreneurial families condemned for their illegal activities, families praised for their contribution to economic development and family business groups that are blazing trails in the globalization process are all subjects for future scholarly empirical research. This is a far better option than to depict such diverse entrepreneurial families with a broad stroke as all-powerful, ever present, "extractive oligarchies".
This study also clearly shows that the entrepreneurial family as the unit of analysis used here, is different from the family firm and deserve room in the family business scholarly literature. It would be worthwhile continuing to research the entrepreneurial family, as much in its endogenous factors (structure, education, values, the role of kinship and its reproduction, division of work among members, succession, intergenerational transition, the family as reservoir of entrepreneurship, etc.), as in the handling of and adaptation to the contexts through which the entrepreneurial family passes from generation to generation. This paper hopes to contribute in this aspect. For this we have to turn to the focus points and tools of history, especially business history, as well as the traditions of sociological and anthroplogical studies on family (for example, Adler and Pérez-Lizaur 1987) . As previously noted, entrepreneurial families should be studied in diverse contexts of economic development (comparative research between advanced and emerging economies, but also between the latter, for example, between various Latin
American countries, and also between these and Spain).
It would seem that, in addition to engaging in dialogue with critics of family structures in the corporate governance of businesses groups (Morck and Steir 2005, Morck 2010) , and with the critics of families as oligarchical institutions who only have their own interests at heart (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) , the subject explored in this chapter,
